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Abstract
Background: Best practices for conflict-of-interest (COI) policies in medical schools have evolved rapidly over the
past decade, in part motivated by the American Medical Student Association (AMSA) scorecard that has publicly
graded schools since 2007. This report describes the methodological update and impact of revisions to the
scorecard in 2014.
Methods: The original AMSA scorecard (used annually from 2008 to 2013) was revised by a work group to
improve its methodology and to increase the stringency of its criteria for scoring COI policies. All U.S. medical
schools (both allopathic and osteopathic; n = 160) were invited to submit their COI policies to AMSA for scoring
with the new scorecard; web site searches were used to acquire policy information for schools that did not
submit. The authors developed a codebook and analyzed 14 distinct categories of COI policies, pertaining to activities
such as industry-funded gifts, meals, educational events, site access for sales reps, and conflict-of-interest disclosure
requirements. The analysis yielded four possible grades for each school: A, B, C, or I (incomplete). The authors
compared 2014 grades with 2013 grades, and compared the distribution of grades of schools by type (allopathic vs.
osteopathic) and geographical region.
Results: A total of 27 (16.9 %) medical schools scored A grades, indicating that their COI policies were strong, 81
(50.6 %) scored B, 25 (15.6 %) scored C and 26 (16.3 %) policies scored I. As compared to 2013, in 2014 fewer
schools qualified for A grades (17.0 % vs. 26.0 %; p = 0.05). The grade distributions of allopathic and osteopathic
schools were significantly different (p < 0.0001), with osteopathic schools more likely than allopathic schools to
have incomplete policies. There were no significant grade differences by geographical region.
Conclusions: The revised 2014 AMSA scorecard, with its more stringent criteria for evaluating COI policies, assigned
fewer As and more Bs and Cs than in years past. This was the first study to identify schools with COI policies stronger
than those recommended in 2008 by the Association of American Medical Colleges. Developing more stringent COI
policies should be helpful in reducing the influence of pharmaceutical and device industry marketing on both trainees
and faculty in American medical schools.
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Background
While collaboration between academic physicians and
universities and industry benefit medical research and has
led to the development of many important treatments,
they also have the potential to influence research and
medical education [1]. Studies have shown that industry
influence—whether in the form of gifts, commercially sup-
ported education, or simply visits with pharmaceutical
representatives—can lead to more expensive and less
evidence-based prescribing practices [2].
In response to these concerns, several national orga-
nizations recommended that medical schools create
explicit guidelines for regulating the relationships be-
tween physicians and industry. Particularly influential
were the recommendations published by the Associ-
ation of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) which
recommended the elimination, or strict regulation, of a
variety of industry-funded activities, such as the
provision of gifts and meals, continuing medical educa-
tion (CME), speakers bureaus and the presence of sales
representatives on campus [3].
In 2007, the American Medical Student Association
(AMSA) began assessing medical schools’ conflict-of-
interest (COI) policies by simply reporting whether or
not schools had developed such policies. In 2008, AMSA
collaborated with the Pew Prescription Project to create
a more elaborate scorecard which analyzed 11 COI pol-
icy domains, such as industry-funded gifts and meals,
educational programs, and scholarships. Schools were
invited to submit policies directly to AMSA, which were
analyzed on a four-point scale from 0 (no policy) to 3
(model policy). Schools which did not respond to re-
quests for policies received an automatic F, while those
reporting that their policies were under revision scored a
provisional I for in process.
The scorecard assessed polices annually from 2008 to
2013 (the 2011–2012 scorecards were combined); by
2013, the percentage of medical schools receiving overall
A grades had increased steadily to 25.9 %, from 4.7 % in
2008 [4]. Since its inception, the AMSA scorecard has
generated considerable media attention and has influ-
enced the development or strengthening of COI policies
at many academic institutions [5–7]. This report de-
scribes the methodological update and impact of revi-
sions to the scorecard in 2014.
Methods
Revision of AMSA scorecard
In 2011, The Pew Charitable Trusts and AMSA planned
for a major revision of the scorecard, an effort that was
supported by a grant from the Oregon Attorney General
Consumer and Prescriber Education Program [8]. The
purposes of the revision were to update the criteria for
model policies and to enhance the instrument’s meth-
odological rigor [9].
In order to accomplish this, two committees were cre-
ated: an expert task force on medical conflicts of interest
and a scorecard methodology work group. The expert
task force, composed of leaders in academic medicine as
well as other partners, including AMSA, met 5 times
between May 2012 and January 2013. This committee
reviewed the literature on COI, interviewed other ex-
perts about the feasibility of implementing policies in
academic medical centers, and reviewed model policies
currently in existence. By consensus the group adopted
aspirational best practices, with the understanding that
reaching these goals would take time for institutions, es-
pecially those with academic cultures resistant to such
changes. The task force published its recommendations
in December 2013 [10, 11]. In addition to the expert task
force, a methodology work group was formed composed
of representatives from Pew (DJC and SB), AMSA (TF
and RR), and a methodology consultant (JSR). We (the
methodology work group) met eight times from July
2012 to March 2014, examining and revising the do-
mains used in the original scorecard, as well as the scor-
ing system. Overall, three major changes were made to
the AMSA Scorecard: the COI policy domains were re-
vised and expanded, the criteria to score each domain
was revised, and the formula used to aggregate the do-
main scores to calculate an overall grade was revised.
Revising and expanding COI domains
We increased the number of COI domains from 11 to
14 to better reflect the breadth of policies in medical
schools (Table 1). Some domains were split into two cat-
egories, because medical schools have been developing
policies that address them as distinct areas. For example,
“gifts including meals” was split into “gifts” and “meals,”
and “industry sales representatives” was separated into
“pharmaceutical sales representatives” and “medical de-
vice representatives.” We added some new domains,
such as “ghostwriting” and “extension,” the latter being a
domain to assess whether faculty are required to abide
by the medical school’s COI policies even when they
practice or teach in other settings. While we did not
eliminate any domains, we shifted two from the medical
school scorecard to a new scorecard tailored specifically
for teaching hospitals, namely, “pharmaceutical samples”
and “pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committees”.
Revising the criteria for scoring domains
We revised the criteria used for scoring policies such
that most domains were scored more stringently (see
Table 1 for a comparison of model policies in the two
scorecards). These changes were based on the recom-
mendations of the expert task force as well as other
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sources, such as the revised American Medical Associ-
ation ethics policy regarding industry funding of CME
[12]. In addition, we altered some ratings so that they
were better aligned with reporting requirements of the
Physician Payments Sunshine Act [13]. For instance, the
Sunshine Act requires that the value of all meals paid
for by industry at CME courses be reported. Accord-
ingly, the scorecard required prohibition of industry sup-
ported CME meals in order to achieve the highest score
in the meals category.
We assigned model policies a score of ‘3’. Non-model
policies were scored as either a ‘2’ (defined as good pro-
gress toward model policy) or a ‘1’ (defined as policy that
does not address this domain or is unlikely to have a
substantial effect on behavior). We developed a scoring
codebook (available on AMSA’s Scorecard website) that
included each COI policy domain and examples of pol-
icies that would score a 1, 2, or 3 for each domain [14].
In contrast to the original AMSA scoring system, which
was a 4 point system (0–3), the new system is a 3 point
system (1–3), with non-existent policies scored as “1”,
identical to the score for ineffectual policies.
Revising the scorecard grading formula
We revised the original formula used to calculate overall
grades in two ways. First, we simplified policy scoring by
weighting all 14 domains equally, rather than weighting
some domains more heavily than others, as the original
Table 1 Revision of AMSA scorecard model COI policies
Policy Area 2008 AAMC Recommendation Original AMSA Scorecard Model Policy 2014 AMSA Scorecard Model Policy
Conflict of Interest Disclosure Domain not addressed Disclose on public website and/or
to patients
Disclose to institution and externally
to medical students and trainees
Industry-funded speakers’
bureausa
Strongly discouraged Prohibited Prohibited
Industry-support of accredited
CME
Permitted if funds coordinated
and overseen by a central
CME office
Permitted if funds coordinated and
overseen by a central CME office
Permitted in rare circumstances such as





Prohibited Permitted, but travel funds must be
awarded independent of industry
influence
Prohibited
Access of pharmaceutical sales
representatives to AMCsa
Permitted by appointment only,






Access of medical device
representatives to AMCsb
Permitted by appointment,
with prior disclosure and
patient consent, and for
technical assistance and
in-service training only.
Domain not addressed Permitted by appointment, with prior
disclosure and patient consent, and
for technical assistance and in-service
training only.
COI curriculuma Required for all phases of
medical education.
Required for all phases of medical
education.
Required, with a comprehensive
curriculum mirroring AMSA best
practices.
Extension of AMC COI policies
to community teaching affiliates
and to all facultyb
Required off-site. Domain not addressed Required off-site and for all faculty,
including voluntary.
Gifts Prohibited Prohibited except textbooks Prohibited
Meals Prohibited, except when in
connection with CME
programming.
Prohibited, except when in
connection with CME programming.
All meals prohibited, including in CME
courses
Consulting Permitted if compensation
reflects the fair market value
of the services provided.
Permitted with prior approval, plus
either formal contract or payment
commensurate to deliverable
Permitted if consulting is limited to
scientific and not marketing topics.
Ghostwriting and Honorary
Authorshipb
Prohibited Domain not addressed Prohibited
Industry-Supported Travel
Scholarships for Trainees






Permitted, but recipient selection must
be independent of industry sponsor
Prohibited
Enforcementb Domain not addressed Required, but not part of formal
scoring
Required, and integrated into final
score
aModel policies identical in original and new versions
bPolicies not present in original version of scorecard
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scorecard had done. Second, we eliminated the D and F
grades since it was not clear that distinguishing among 5
different calibers of policies was necessary or meaningful.
We derived a total score for each medical school by
adding the individual scores for each of the 14 domains.
Since each domain can score from 1 (poor or no policy)
to 3 (model policy), the possible scoring range for each
school was 14–42. Based on the raw score, we calculated
a standardized score with the following formula: (Raw
score * 2) + 16 = Standardized score. We used this for-
mula in order to convert the maximum raw score of 42
into a more intuitive maximum of 100. To transform the
standardized score into a percentage, we divided it by
the maximum score and multiplied by 100. Finally, we
created rules for assigning percentages into letter grades
(Table 2).
Regrading medical school COI policies
In order to collect information on medical school COI
policies for the revised AMSA Scorecard, we invited all
U.S. schools of allopathic and osteopathic medicine to
submit policies to AMSA for grading. We sent emails to
appropriate contacts at these schools (deans, COI offi-
cers, etc. as established by previous year’s contact at each
school) explaining the Scorecard project and requesting
the submission of their policies (Additional file 1).
For those schools that did not respond to our re-
quest for submissions, we searched online for their
COI policies. In order to maximize our ability to re-
trieve all policies, we developed a systematic search
process. This included using a list of search terms
(such as “conflict of interest,” “industry interactions,”
and “vendor policies”), searching the prior AMSA re-
cords for any publically posted policies, and checking
the Institute on Medicine as a Profession (IMAP) web-
site, which publishes a database of publically available
policy documents [15]. When we could not find infor-
mation on particular domains, we emailed and called
compliance officers to ask about specific policies. In
cases where we were unable to retrieve policies for
specific scoring areas, we noted “no policy found” in
our documentation.
Prior to re-grading the medical school COI policies, all
analysts were provided with formal training in the re-
vised scoring system and use of the scoring codebook.
We assessed the reliability of our scoring system by
having all analysts score the policies of five medical
schools. Our inter-rater reliability, measured using per-
cent agreement, varied from 80.0 to 92.0 %, with Kappa
scores ranging from 0.65 to 0.85, across the four analysts.
In addition, because we used two different methodolo-
gies to retrieve policy information (assessing submitted
policies submitted vs. finding policies via web-searches),
there was a possibility of bias in favor of those schools
which submitted policies. Web searches may miss COI
policies that exist, but which institutions have not made
publically available. This, in turn, could lead to falsely
low grades for such schools. In order to assess the ro-
bustness of our web-search methodology, we randomly
selected 15 % of the schools which had submitted
complete policies, and rescored them using policies
identified from web-searches. In 9 out of 10 of these
schools, the final grade did not change, validating our
use of both submitted and web-search identified COI
policies for the 2014 AMSA Scorecard.
Statistical analysis
We used descriptive statistics to characterize the COI
policies identified for medical schools, overall and strati-
fied by two key characteristics: type of school (allopathic
vs. osteopathic) and location (categorized by U.S. Census
Regions: northeast, south, midwest, west). In addition,
we used chi-square and Fischer Exact tests to examine
differences in overall AMSA Scorecard grades in 2013
and 2014, as well as for differences in 2014 grades by
the medical school characteristics described above. All
analyses were conducted using JMP 10.0 (SAS Institute;
Cary, NC). All statistical tests were two-tailed and used
a type I error rate of 0.017 to account for multiple com-
parisons across 3 medical school characteristics.
Results
Overall grades
Our call for COI policies yielded submissions from 77 of
161 medical schools, a 47.8 % response rate. We scored
the remainder of schools based on policies identified via
web searches. Overall, school grades were as follows: 27
received A (16.9 %), 81 B (50.6 %), 25 C (15.6 %), and 26
Incompletes, or I (16.3 %) and represented a significantly
different distribution in 2014 when compared with 2013
(p < 0.001; Table 3). In particular, consistent with the
more stringent scoring criteria, fewer schools received
A’s in 2014 when compared with 2013 (17.0 % vs.
26.0 %; p = 0.05).
Table 2 Methodology for assigning letter grades to medical
schools’ COI policies




A For a school to achieve
this grade, at least half
(7 of 14) of its COI policies
were rated as excellent.
≥ 85 % ≥ 35
B Up to 6 COI policies were
excellent.
≥ 72 %. 28–34
C Up to half of policies were
poor or absent.
≥ 56 % 20–27
I More than half of policies
were poor or absent.
≤ 54 % ≤ 19
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Individual domains
Because the criteria for ratings of individual COI do-
mains varied between 2013 and 2014, direct compari-
sons for most domains are not meaningful, with two
exceptions: speakers’ bureaus and pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives (Table 4). In all years of the AMSA scorecard,
the model policy was to forbid faculty from participating
in promotional speakers bureaus, and to ban promo-
tional detailing by pharmaceutical representatives.
In 2014, 79 schools (49.4 %) effectively banned their
faculty from serving on industry promotional speaker’s
bureaus, up from 43 (27.2 %) in 2013. In addition, 9
schools (5.6 %) banned pharmaceutical detailing in 2014,
up from 4 schools (2.5 %) in 2013. For several domains,
dramatically fewer schools were rated as having model
policies. Examples include meals (15 % in 2014, down
from 58.9 % in 2013), CME (3.1 %, down from 63.9 %),
scholarships (1.9 %, down from 76.6 %), consulting
(16.3 %, down from 44.9 %), curriculum (21.3 %, down
from 51.3 %), and gifts (49.1 % in 2014 versus 58.9 % in
2013) (Table 4).
The COI domains with the highest number of medical
schools having model policies were speakers’ bureaus
(79; 49.1 %), medical device representatives (91; 56.5 %),
gifts (79; 49.4 %), ghostwriting (105; 65.6 %), and en-
forcement (126; 78.8 %).
Comparisons of types of schools
We compared the grade distributions of schools by
both medical school type and by geographic region
(Table 5). We found that a significantly higher propor-
tion of allopathic schools received A grades, while
osteopathic schools were more likely to have incom-
plete policies (p < 0.001). All four geographic regions
(northeast, south, west, midwest) had similar grade dis-
tributions. Schools from Puerto Rico were classified as
“other.”
Discussion
In 2014, AMSA revised its COI scorecard by streamlin-
ing its methodology, and making the criteria for model
policies more stringent. Not surprisingly, fewer schools
achieved an overall A grade on the COI scorecard in
2014 (16.9 %) than in 2013 (25.9 %). It is important to
highlight that the decrease in schools with A grades does
not imply that schools’ policies have become weaker
since 2013, but rather reflects the strengthening of
AMSA’s criteria for evaluating model policies. We set
the policy bar higher to reflect a building consensus that
the ideal medical education environment should be
based entirely on current medical evidence, with no
influence—whether direct or indirect—from the market-
ing departments of industry.
For five policy domains, we found that our revised cri-
teria led to particularly dramatic reductions in the per-
centage of schools qualifying with model policies. Those
domains are outlined below along with a brief explanation
of why schools’ ratings decreased so profoundly.
1. Continuing medical education (63.9 % rated model
policy in 2013, versus 3.1 % in 2014). The 2013
criteria reflected the 2008 AAMC recommendations
that industry funding of CME is acceptable as long
as all such funding is overseen by a central CME
office in the medical school. Indeed, in 2013, the
Table 3 Distribution of medical school COI scorecard grades,
2013 vs. 2014
Overall COI Scorecard Grade 2013 Scorecard
Grading (n = 158)
2014 Scorecard
Grading (n = 160)
A 41 (25.9 %) 27 (16.9 %)
B 74 (46.8 %) 82 (50.6 %)
C 13 (8.2 %) 25 (15.6 %)
D 13 (8.2 %) N/A
F 11 (7.0 %) N/A
Incomplete or In process 6 (3.8 %) 26 (16.3 %)
p < 0.001for overall distribution of grades
Table 4 Frequency of model COI policies by individual domains,
2013 vs. 2014





(n = 158) (n = 160)
Disclosure 39 (24.7 %) 51 (31.7 %) 0.15
Speakers’ bureausb 43 (27.2 %) 79 (49.4 %) < 0.0001
Continuing medical
education
101 (63.9 %) 5 (3.1 %) < 0.0001
Attendance of promotional
events
N/A 25 (15.6 %) n/a
Pharmaceutical sales
representativesb
4 (2.5 %) 9 (5.6 %) 0.26
Medical device
representatives
N/A 91 (56.9 %) n/a
COI curriculum 81 (51.3 %) 34 (21.3 %) < 0.0001
Extension of COI policies N/A 50 (31.3 %) n/a
Giftsc 93 (58.9 %) 79 (49.4 %) 0.09
Mealsc 93 (58.9 %) 24 (15 %) < 0.0001
Consulting 71 (44.9 %) 26 (16.3 %) < 0.0001
Ghostwriting N/A 105 (65.6 %) n/a
Scholarships 121 (76.6 %) 3 (1.9 %) < 0.0001
Enforcement N/A 126 (78.8 %) n/a
Notes: aModel policy defined as scoring a ‘3’ within the AMSA
Scorecard codebook
bCOI domains with model criteria that were identical in 2013 and 2014; all
other criteria for model policies were changed in 2014
cGifts and meals were scored as one domain, “gifts”, in the 2013 version
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majority of schools had adopted this
recommendation. However, the Pew Expert
Task force recognized that central oversight, per se,
is not always effective at preventing excessive
reliance on industry CME funding, and that more
stringent measures were needed. Accordingly, our
Work Group revised the model criteria to align
with these recommendations. The substantial
decrease in schools with the model policy reflects
the fact that schools are not ready to take measures
to significantly reduce reliance on industry funding
for CME.
2. COI Curriculum. (51.3 % rated model policy in
2013, versus 21.3 % in 2014). The original criteria
defined a model policy as one that required some
type of curriculum teaching the principles of COI
for all phases of medical education (including at
both medical schools and during residency training).
The updated criteria went one step further, requiring
that schools adopt a comprehensive curriculum
reflecting AMSA best practices [16].
3. Meals (58.9 % rated model policy in 2013, versus
15 % in 2014). The AAMC and the original AMSA
criteria allowed industry-funded meals only in the
context of accredited CME events. However, the
Pew Expert task force could find no evidence that
meals paid for by industry at CME courses were any
less likely to engender gratitude in the recipient than
meals in other settings. In all cases, the recipients
know who is paying for their food, and are therefore
equally motivated to return the favor in some way.
Recognizing this source of potential influence, the
Physician Payments Sunshine Act requires public
disclosure of all industry meals, even those at CME
courses. Best COI practices would prohibit accept-
ance of any industry-funded meal;
however, we found that only 15 % of schools
had such a policy.
4. Consulting (44.9 % rated model policy in 2013,
versus 16.3 % in 2014). The 2013 AMSA model
policy criteria allowed consulting with industry
as long as the consultant received permission in
advance from their institution. The Pew expert
task force recommended that medical schools
limit faculty consulting to scientific topics only,
and prohibit marketing consultation oriented
toward product promotion. Using these criteria,
we found that such robust policies were uncommon.
5. Scholarships (79.6 % rated model policy in 2013,
versus 1.9 % in 2014). The 2013 criteria allowed
industry to fund travel scholarships to trainees as
long as the recipients were selected independently
from the sponsor. The Pew expert task force
reasoned that such scholarships were essentially
gifts to trainees and were therefore likely to
influence attitudes in favor of the funding company.
Therefore, AMSA best practices suggest a
prohibition of these scholarships, unless they are
given to fund legitimate research activities. We
found that such restrictive policies were very rare.
In contrast with the above examples, one domain—-
speakers’ bureaus—saw a significant rise in the pro-
portion of schools with model policies, from 27.2 % in
2013 to 49.4 % in 2014. Since the scoring criteria were
identical in the two versions of the scorecard, we can
be confident that this change represents a genuine im-
provement in schools’ policies. Over the last several years,
websites have publically disclosed the names of physicians
who have received payments for promotional speaking,
and this rise in transparency may have influenced schools
to limit such activities to prevent negative publicity.
Table 5 2014 AMSA scorecard grade, stratified by medical school characteristics, 2014
Medical School
Characteristics
Overall AMSA Scorecard Grade P value
A B C I
School Type (n = 160) < 0.0001
Allopathic (136 schools) 24 (17.6 %) 79 (58.1 %) 23 (16.9 %) 10 (7.4 %)
Osteopathic (24 schools)* 3 (12.5 %) 3 (12.5 %) 2 (8.3 %) 16 (66.7 %)
School Location (n = 160)† 0.20
(does not include the
Puerto Rico schools)
Northeast (39 schools) 7 (17.9 %) 22 (56.4 %) 4 (10.4 %) 6 (15.4 %)
South (58 schools) 11 (19 %) 28 (48.3 %) 10 (17.2 %) 9 (15.5 %)
Midwest (36 schools) 4 (5.6 %) 18 (50 %) 11 (30.6 %) 3 (8.3 %)
West (23 schools) 5 (21.7 %) 14 (60.9 %) 0 (0 %) 4 (17.4 %)
Other (Puerto Rico, 4 schools) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 4 (100 %)
Notes: *Osteopathic medical schools that have not yet graduated a medical school class were not included in the 2014 Scorecard
†United States Census Bureau, “Census Regions and Divisions of the United States,” accessed May 26, 2016, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_census_divreg.html
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Our finding that osteopathic schools are significantly
less likely to have complete COI policies may reflect
less of a perceived need for such policies. Osteopathic
schools are less likely than allopathic schools to own
their own hospitals and to engage in clinical research
[17], and we assume that this creates a natural barrier,
leading to less contact with industry representatives.
Many stakeholders (including accrediting and funding
agencies, medical school applicants, and residency pro-
grams) are attentive to allopathic school-osteopathic
school similarities and differences at many levels [18],
and our findings contribute to that literature.
The Institute on Medicine as a Profession (IMAP), like
us, has systematically evaluated medical school COI pol-
icies. Comparing 2008 with 2011, they found that the
proportion of policies rated “moderate” increased from
18 to 72 %, but that there were very few schools with
“strong” policies—1 % in 2008, and 4 % in 2011. IMAP
characterized policy changes as a “race to the middle”
rather than a race to the top [19]. It is not possible to
compare our findings to those of IMAP because of dif-
ferences in methodology, such as variations in model
policy criteria.
We found that while many schools have imposed re-
strictions on certain financial relationships between
physicians and companies, a culture of dependence on
industry largesse—albeit a culture that is changing for
the better—persists. For example, many schools osten-
sibly have no-gift policies, and yet most of them still
allow companies to purchase expensive textbooks for
students and faculty. Although pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives are now typically banned from purchasing
meals for academic staff, most schools still allow com-
pany gifting of meals when the payment is indirect,
such as during industry supported CME courses. Simi-
larly, while many schools forbid industry from paying fac-
ulty to attend meetings, the practice of allowing industry
to fund “scholarships” to pay for students to attend con-
ferences persisted in nearly all the schools we assessed.
Such payments have no clear benefit in terms of ad-
vancing medical research or patient treatment. Instead,
they are likely to produce a sense of gratitude and reci-
procity toward benefactor companies in both trainees
and faculty—which may translate into clinical decisions
favoring newer and more expensive drugs over equiva-
lent and cheaper alternatives. Indeed, evidence has accu-
mulated that medical schools with stronger COI policies
graduate students who prescribe more rationally [20].
Conclusion
The revised 2014 AMSA scorecard is unique in that it
identifies which medical schools have implemented pol-
icies that are more stringent than those recommended by
the Association of American Medical Colleges in 2008.
We hope that these results will encourage schools to
develop stronger COI policies in order to protect the
integrity of medical education, as well as to protect the
reputations of their institutions. This is important in
light of the 2014 launch of the Open Payments website
(mandated by the Sunshine Act), which publishes the
names of most physician recipients of industry gifts,
along with the dollar value of the gift, the brand name
of the product related to the gift, and other data. We
speculate that this comprehensive public disclosure
may drive medical schools to reevaluate whether the
relatively small financial benefits of items such as free
textbooks and CME meals is worth the scrutiny of pa-
tients who may question whether their doctors are influ-
enced by such gifts. The AMSA scorecard is publically
available [21], and we anticipate that medical school lead-
ership will use it to access examples of model policies as
they develop stronger COI policies in the future.
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